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An Investigation into the Formal Institutional Constraints that Restrict Entrepreneurship and SME Growth in Russia

The impact of institutions on the ease of doing business in transition economies has attracted considerable interest in recent years. The literature suggests that institutional quality is crucial in determining levels of entrepreneurship and SME development in such countries. Our research explores the perceptions of Russian SME owners regarding the quality of the institutional environment that they face making use of semi-structured interviews for data gathering purposes. We identify the political, economic and regulatory barriers that restrict entrepreneurship and SME growth in contemporary Russia, together with entrepreneurs’ views as to what reforms are needed for greater business growth in future. 





Institutional theory focuses conventionally on the “rules of the game” or, more properly, on the “humanly devised” constraints and barriers that “shape political, economic and social interactions” (North 1990, 3-5). Two distinctive but complementary sets of institutions can be identified (North 1994, 360),  “formal” and “informal,” exemplified by “rules, laws, constitutions” and “norms of behaviour, conventions [and] self-imposed codes of conduct” respectively. 
This paper focuses on formal institutional barriers, and on the obstacles that restrict entrepreneurship and small and medium sized enterprise (SME) development that is so much needed for a new economic model and sustainable growth in modern Russia. Academic interest in entrepreneurship in developing and transition economies has been on the increase in recent years, especially in the case of larger, more prominent countries such as Russia and China (Chen 2006; Kapeliushnikov et al. 2013; Khanna and Palepu 2010). There is now considerable interest, for example in the contribution that SME development is making to the economic transition from the plan to the market in these two countries (Anderson et al. 2003; Estrin, Meyer, and Bytchkova 2006; Zhuplev and Shtykhno 2009). 
A number of scholars (including Heliste, Karhunen, and Kosonen 2008; Smallbone and Welter 2001) have sought to analyze the changing institutional conditions that shape the business environment for entrepreneurs and thus influence the expansion and development of SMEs in emerging and transition economies, such as China and Russia. However, the impact of formal institutions (Holmes et al. 2013) on the SME owner-managers’ opportunities, thinking, plans and strategies has been empirically under-researched to date, whilst such studies have been particularly scarce in the case of Russia (Volchek, Henttonen, and Edelmann 2013). This study therefore makes use of exploratory research in order to help fill this gap in the existing literature, drawing on case study methods to identify which formal institutional constraints are believed by SME owner-managers to restrict entrepreneurship and SME development in contemporary Russia, together with what now needs to be done to overcome these restrictions and thus facilitate SME growth in the future.
Russia is conventionally ranked as a developing as well as a transition economy (EBRD 2013) having experienced a period of hitherto unprecedented political and socio-economic transformation from the plan to the market over the past two decades (Aleksashenko 2012; Myant and Drahokoupil 2010). These profound changes have had a drastic effect on Russia’s institutional formation and development, yet the formal institutional environment facing its SMEs is still weak, unpredictable and unstable (Heliste et al. 2008; Molz, Tabbaa,  and Totskaya 2009). Official reports (for example, EIB 2013) indicate that Russia is in fact not only one of the most potentially attractive, but also one of the most problematic transition economy locations for entrepreneurship and SME development, owing to its mix of market growth-related development opportunities, path-dependency and offsetting institutional barriers. Empirical studies (such as Volchek et al. 2013) reveal that the country’s institutional restrictions take a variety of forms, including high borrowing costs, complex taxation regimes and bureaucracy.  Taken together, these restrictions help to explain Russia’s low levels of entrepreneurship development relative to other comparable developing and transition economy countries, such as Brazil and Poland (Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz 2008), while also contributing to the relative advantage of established over new Russian entrepreneurs. Unless these institutional problems are addressed, and appropriate government policy responses are made, then we would argue that substantial growth in Russia’s entrepreneurship and SME sector will be impossible to achieve, leading to negative effects on the country’s future prosperity and economic prospects (Aidis et al. 2008; Puffer, McCarthy and Boisot 2010). 
The persistent institutional problems faced by Russian business people and the need for  substantial reforms as a vital precondition for the creation of a stronger SME presence have been recognized in both theoretical (Panina and Bierman 2013; Puffer and McCarthy 2007) and empirical research (Aidis and Adachi 2007). It can be argued, however that these conclusions can usefully be added to qualitative findings, making it easier to determine the thinking underlying owner managers’ actions and, more specifically, the reasons for their responses to institutional voids and handicaps.
 The research underlying the current paper makes use of an interpretative,  exploratory approach, gathering qualitative, case study data in order to investigate the constraints that formal institutions appear to be creating for entrepreneurship and SME development in Russia, according to owner-managers’ perceptions.  Seventeen semi-structured interviews were carried out enabling participants to voice their views and concerns as to Russia’s formal institutional challenges, their attitudes and feelings towards them and the institutional reforms that are still needed to facilitate more rule-based and trouble-free SME development.  The use of interviews also helped us to contribute to theory development by examining how participants’ thinking and actions were evolving, in response to changes over time in Russia’s institutional framework (Boyacigiller and Adler 1991; Parkhe 1993). 
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. We firstly review the literature on the characteristics of formal institutions and their impact on entrepreneurship and SME development in Russia, before going on to examine the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of institutional imperfections on SMEs in a transition economy and, in particular, the Russian context. We next outline the research methodology used in our study, following which we set out and subsequently discuss our research findings. The final section of the paper outlines the conclusions, research limitations and policy implications arising from our findings.

CHARACTERISTICS OF FORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND IMPACT ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SME DEVELOPMENT
The level of entrepreneurial activity and SME development in developing and transition economies can be enabled or constrained by business and institutional environments (Aidis et al. 2008; Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Li 2010; Estrin and Mickiewicz 2011; Molz et al. 2009). Whereas the business environment is principally concerned with business and transaction costs (Moore and Schmitz 2008), the formal institutional environment shapes owner-managers’ actions, strategies and SMEs’ commercial performance (Bruton et al. 2010). The stability of the national business environment depends on the quality of each country’s institutions (Keefer and Knack 1997), which in turn create opportunities and barriers for entrepreneurship (Hwang and Powell 2005), and for the development and growth of business entities (Soto 2000; Baumol, Litan, and Schramm 2009). SMEs are particularly vulnerable to instability in their national institutional environments (Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone 2003) and, indeed, they are likely to experience the greatest negative effects associated with institutional imperfections (Molz et al. 2009). Moreover, their business activities and optimistic prospects in the country are vital for a favourable investment climate, which is “made up of the many location-specific factors that shape the opportunities and incentives for firms to invest productively, create jobs, and expand” (World Bank 2007, 3). Dollar, Hallward-Driemeir and Mengistae (2006) also argue that business and investment environments are affected by the quality of institutional policies and regulatory conditions such as macroeconomic and financial stability, the degree of infrastructure development, system of taxation, probability and extent of government intervention in economic processes, costs of factors of production as well as levels of corruption, the rule of law and the security of property rights. 
Institutional theorists traditionally divide institutions into two main elements – formal and informal – each of which interrelate, and influence the ability of entrepreneurs and SMEs to thrive, develop and grow (Bruton et al. 2010; Holmes et al. 2013). Formal institutions provide a set of codified rules and standards (North 1990), which promote order and stability by providing authoritative guidelines for individual and organizational behaviour (Scott 1995). Informal institutions, in contrast, constitute a culturally based and historically enduring set of meanings and understandings shared by each country’s inhabitants that shape social cohesion and coordination (Scott 2005). The characteristics of each country’s informal institutions, and in particular, the degree of individualism or collectivism and power distance that they reflect (Hofstede 1984) determine the nature and development of their formal institutions, and therefore the institutional environment within which entrepreneurs and SMEs interact (Holmes et al. 2013). Collectivist societies, including Russia (Geert-Hofstede 2015; Michailova, McCarthy, and Puffer 2013) value cooperation and conformity (Greif 1994) and exert support for strong, formal institutions capable of controlling the behaviour of individuals and organizations, such as entrepreneurs and SME managers (Knack and Keefer 1997). 
Three sets of formal institutions – political, regulatory and economic – together create the rules and standards and define the established national order within which entrepreneurs and SMEs operate (Holmes et al. 2013). Firstly, political institutions frame the stability of the formal institutional environment and the predictability of institutional change, together with the openness and transparency of government policies towards business, and the political priority given to support for national entrepreneurs and SME development (Henisz 2000; Hillman and Keim 1995; Persson 2002). In the second place, regulatory institutions codify society’s expectations and requirements regarding the power and behaviour of businesses and their commercial practices, whilst also determining their degree of legal protection, law-enforcement and the levels of bureaucracy as well as corrupt practices with which they must deal (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 2005; Spicer et al. 2000). Thirdly, economic institutions set the rules and conditions that determine the financial resources available to businesses, the monetary costs, incentives and risks that they face when borrowing and undertaking capital investment as well as the rates of taxation and other rents that they must pay (Pissarides 1999; Becchetti and Giovanni 2002; Beck and Asli 2006). 
All three sets of institutions rely for their existence on national governments, which have the capacity to use their sovereign powers to operate legal and control systems that institute rules, monitor business compliance with them, and punish any failure to conform (Scott 2005), so potentially benefitting entrepreneurs and SME development. A lack of properly functioning institutional arrangements can, on the other hand, harm the functioning of the markets in which SMEs trade (Dutz, Ordover, and Willig 2000), whilst dysfunctional institutions can also channel entrepreneurs into unproductive, unethical and informal economic activities (Baumol 1990). 
The importance of institutions to entrepreneurship and SME development has been widely discussed in the literature in recent years from the theoretical (Bruton et al. 2010; Williamson 2000) and the empirical perspectives (Heliste et al. 2008; Holmes et al. 2013). 
Smaller businesses need clear rules and regulations that formal institutions should provide in order to make their markets more predictable and less irrational. Holmes et al. (2013) argue on behalf of the positive effects exerted by formal institutions, adding that regulations with attendant sanctions for non-compliance support order and stability, with beneficial consequences for businesses. Seyoum (2009) also finds that countries with strong formal institutions are normally more resistant to the corruption of legal processes, extortions and outcomes, lessening the need for entrepreneurs to rely on informal business dealings. 
Where countries’ formal institutional environments prove to be dysfunctional and ineffective, there will be a negative impact on entrepreneurship (Peng 2003) by creating instability and unpredictably (Batra et al. 2003; Henisz 2000), institutional voids (Puffer et al. 2010), excessive compliance costs, as well as distorted incentives (Guthrie 2006; Tirole 2003). In such cases, institutions and their officials may operate in an arbitrary, self-serving and corrupt manner, creating barriers to the development of entrepreneurship and SME growth (Aidis et al. 2008; Welter and Smallbone 2003). Entrepreneurs may be able to react to this situation by evading institutions, by bribing government officials in order to obtain contracts, or by informal network development, and in some cases, by seeking to alter institutions by means of lobbying for new regulations to protect their interests (Henrekson and Sanandaji 2010).

IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL IMPERFECTIONS ON SMES IN THE TRANSITION ECONOMY AND RUSSIAN CONTEXT
The attractiveness of institutional environments in developing and transition economy countries and their degree of support for entrepreneurship and SME development has been widely investigated in the literature. Peng (2003) and Puffer et al. (2010) argue that institutional conditions tend to be considerably less favourable in the transition economy context, where businesses are typically more vulnerable and often easily exposed to institutional handicaps. Other researchers (Dollar et al. 2006; Smallbone and Welter 2001) empirically establish that smaller firms are likely to experience the most negative effects from institutional imperfections in developing and transition economy countries, creating high levels of cost and risk for entrepreneurs which act as deterrents to SME development.  
Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011) show that entrepreneurship and SME creation still remain lower in transition economies than in other developing countries, despite the fact that more than 20 years have now elapsed since the fall of communism. This problem appears to be worse in the case of the former Soviet Union (Estrin et al. 2006), where individuals’ propensity to become entrepreneurs remains lower than that of other comparable transition economies such as China and Poland (McMillan and Woodruff 2002).  This situation can be attributed, at least in part, to flawed institutional environments, which (along with macroeconomic instability and a lack of bank finance (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 2000) constitute more of a barrier to SME development in Russia and Ukraine than in more institutionally advanced economies in Central and Eastern Europe (Hashi and Krasniqi 2011).  
A first reading of official international data suggests, counter-intuitively, that Russia may actually be performing more competitively than might be expected in entrepreneurship and SME development terms, notwithstanding its institutional limitations. The World Bank’s (2013a) entrepreneurship activity index shows that Russia created nearly 85,000 new limited liability companies in the nine year period up until 2010, thus outperforming a number of developed OECD countries such as Germany and Japan (as well as more normal comparator countries, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Balkan states (Kihlgren 2003; Xheneti (​http:​/​​/​www.emeraldinsight.com​/​action​/​doSearch?ContribStored=Xheneti%2C+M​) and Bartlett (​http:​/​​/​www.emeraldinsight.com​/​action​/​doSearch?ContribStored=Bartlett%2C+W​) 2012) in terms of newly registered businesses per thousand working age people.  However, there are presently only 17 SMEs per thousand civilians in Russia and these only account for approximately 21% of national GDP compared with 50% of GDP in many developed countries (Ernst and Young 2013; Michailova et al. 2013). The Russian government aims to increase SMEs’ contribution to more than 45% of GDP by 2020 (Kremlin 2015), but this figure is viewed as highly unrealistic by many expert commentators (Ernst and Young 2013; OPORA Russia 2011). Another significant problem of recent years, which is also the result of government initiatives and fiscal policies, is the significantly high number of businesses moving into the informal sector of the economy (Timofeyev 2013). Michailova et al. (2013) go on to stress that it may take many years to change the focus in the Russian economy from prioritizing extracting and exporting natural resources-based businesses to sustaining the types of innovative and value-adding businesses which many SMEs have the potential to become.
The question as to what inhibits legal entrepreneurship and SME development in contemporary Russia can be answered, at least in part, by reference to international reports and survey data on business conditions, in which the perceived weaknesses of the Russian business and institutional environments are repeatedly highlighted. The World Bank (2013b), for example, argues that the business environment in Russia is still unfavorable relative to comparable developing and transition economy countries, taking into account the reported difficulty associated with the opening and running of SMEs by entrepreneurs. Based on these criteria, Russia’s ‘doing business’ ranking was a disappointing 112th out of the 189 countries that the World Bank (2013b) surveyed, leading to the conclusion that Russia’s institutional imperfections remain significant barriers to its business development. Further corroboration is also provided by official survey findings (FIAC 2012), which report that foreign investors identify a number of negative institutional factors that continue to hinder their business activities in Russia, such as high levels of bureaucracy and corruption, weak regulation of property rights, and the failure of the country’s court system to interpret and implement the rule of law in a fair and equitable manner. 
McMillan and Woodruff (2002) also indicate that institutional weaknesses make a marked contribution to the difficulties faced by entrepreneurs in Russia, compared with the more favorable conditions that institutions help to create for SMEs in other developing and transition economy countries. One factor underlying the persistence of these weaknesses in Russia appears to have been the institutional upheaval caused by the rapid and abrupt transformational change that occurred as the country moved from one government system to another in the early 1990s (Ahlstrom and Bruton 2010; Newman 2000). The introduction of a new, more business and entrepreneurship-friendly institutional order was made more difficult to achieve at this time, owing to path dependency effects, since entrepreneurship had been outlawed and obstructed for decades during the communist era (Roth and Kostova 2003). Inter-regional variations in institutional quality also emerged in Russia during the transition period, resulting in differences in the degree of bureaucracy, legal protection and corruption creating varying degrees of related difficulties for SMEs, depending on their geographical location (Bessonova and Gonchar 2015; Yukhanaev, Sharma, and Nevidimova 2014).
A range of far-reaching measures have been introduced in Russia from the 1990s onward, with a view to reforming and modernising Russia’s formal institutional arrangements, thus helping to promote the country’s market reforms and socioeconomic transformation (Aslund, 2008). Substantial reforms to the country’s taxation and corporate governance systems, customs service, bankruptcy procedures, labour market and company law have been enacted, whilst the bureaucratic and administrative obstacles facing businesses, including SMEs, have been systematically targeted for improvement (Yukhanaev et al. 2014b).  The impetus to reform has been by no means consistent even during the period since 2000, with the result that institutional modernization has taken place in a series of interrupted stages, characterized by switches between more and less favourable government policy regimes and objectives towards business (Yakovlev, 2011). The need for comprehensive institutional transformation has also been resisted throughout by powerful, large business interest groups, including oligarchs and state corporations, motivated by their desire to maximise their continued opportunities to profit from rent-seeking behaviour (Yakovlev 2014; Demirbas and Yukhanaev 2011). Russia’s federal government continues to primarily focus its support on long-established, large and state-owned businesses that form an important element in Putin’s governance system and geopolitical prowess (Monaghan 2012; Puffer et al. 2010).
Thus, it can be argued (following Botero et al. 2004) that the shortcomings of Russia’s institutional reform programme are attributed, at least in part, to the existence of institutional inertia and entrenched special interests. There are some indications that the Russian government’s policy priorities towards entrepreneurship may at least begin to change, in that some regional and local administrations are now shifting away from supporting only old companies with good government connections towards helping SMEs with innovative spirits to overcome their institutional constraints (Yakovlev 2010).  
With institutional reform still far from complete, widespread official and business corruption, insufficient protection of property rights, and the persistence of excessive bureaucracy and uncompetitive markets are still identified as highly problematic for entrepreneurs and owner-managers in Russia (Aleksashenko 2012; Wieneke and Gries 2011; Zhuplev and Shtykhno 2009) resulting in predictably negative effects on their performance (Michailova et al. 2013). Personal connections remain vital, therefore, in shielding SMEs from the institutional and environmental uncertainties that in turn impede development, increase transaction costs and facilitate corruption (Puffer et al. 2013). Many owner-managers continue to rely on informal networks, contacts with government officials and inter-personal communications for survival (Meyer and Peng, 2005). Intensive utilization of ‘blat’, ‘svyazi’ and ‘administrative resource’ is vital for mitigation of state coercion, interference with the commercial affairs and protection of businesses from corporate raids and property expropriation by corrupt government officials (Aidis et al. 2008; Batjaral 2006; Michailova and Worm 2003; Yakovlev 2006). These arrangements thus persistently distort the market environment within which Russian SMEs currently operate, as well as preventing many entrepreneurs from planning and achieving business growth.

Research methodology
	In the research underlying this paper, a decision was made to follow an exploratory path, designed to reveal the research participants’ understanding of the institutional constraints that they believed hold back SME development in Russia.  This approach therefore followed the strategy recommended by Voldnes, Grønhaug, and Sogn-Grundvåg (\o "Voldnes, 2014 #34") involving the use of  exploratory and theory generating studies in international business research. 
A number of pitfalls highlighted by Voldnes et al. (2014) as being specifically related to qualitative research in Russia have also had to be addressed. Cultural awareness has, as predicted, presented a major challenge, requiring us to attain trust and openness with our respondents, in order to achieve the necessary in-depth understanding of how owner-managers conduct their businesses, together with the nature of the current institutional problems that they face.  
A case study methodology was selected for this research project (as noted above) because of the need to conduct in-depth contextual exploration and analysis of “a contemporary phenomenon, set within its real-world content - especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (\o "Yin, 2013 #32").  This methodology led to the usual limitations associated with the impracticality of random sampling, while the data gathered lacked generalisability, reliability and validity that could have been achieved by hypothetico-deductive research. These disadvantages were, however, more than offset by our ability to gain richness of data based on the opinions, beliefs and perceptions of owner-managers regarding the institutional barriers to entrepreneurship and SME development in Russia (Huberman and Miles 2002; Jensen and Rodgers 2001).  The use of multiple case studies also allowed us to carry out replication, involving the independent confirmation of emergent constructs and propositions, and to achieve more rigorous results (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007).
Non-probability sampling was utilised in compliance with good qualitative research practice  ADDIN EN.CITE (\o "Patton, 2002 #48"; \o "Silverman, 2014 #35"), whilst also reflecting the practical difficulties involved in obtaining access to data from SMEs in Russia.  A significant number of potential research participants either declined to participate in the study or withdrew before the study began.  We believe that their withdrawal can be attributed largely to their distrust of the interview process and their confidentiality concerns, reinforced by cultural barriers regarding involvement in this kind of academic research (Demirbas and Yukhanaev 2011).  Thus the authors followed the strategy suggested by Eisenhardt and Graebner (\o "Eisenhardt, 2007 #43"), including as many cases as were necessary for reaching theoretical saturation. 
The owner-managers were contacted by e-mail, followed by personal telephone calls in order to encourage them to participate in the study.  Seventeen SME owner-managers eventually gave their consent to take part, with all of their businesses meeting the SME classification criteria regarding ownership structure, workforce numbers and volume of revenues set out in Federal Law 209-FZ on “Development of Small and Medium Entrepreneurship in the Russian Federation” (Ernst and Young 2013). Thus, all companies employed between 15 and 250 people, were privately owned and managed solely by Russian citizens, having been in existence for between three and 20 years, with no prior history of state ownership and annual turnovers of no more than Euro 25 million (table 1). All were also located in the European part of Russia – eight companies in the Central Federal district (Moscow City and Moscow Region), four in the North West district (City of St Petersburg) and five in the South Federal district (City of Rostov-on-Don). Primary data collection took place over the 2012-2015 time period.
------------------------------------
Put Table 1 here
------------------------------------

As public access and sharing of information is challenging in modern Russia, the decision was taken to employ face to face interviews as the main data collection method, supported by observational research (Saunders and Lewis 2012; Silverman 2014). Our study required at least two visits to each of the participating firms in order for the researchers to get engaged with their owner-managers and to explore each business as a separate analytical unit (\o "Remeniy, 2012 #36").  
In order to enable a reasonable degree of flexibility during the interviewing process, a decision to conduct semi-structured interviews was made.  This enabled us to seek clarification from respondents in order to explain unclear parts of the answers that they provided (King and Horrocks 2010).  Active engagement by both the researchers and participants was also required  in order to achieve underlying trust, construe meaning and obtain useful details (\o "Silverman, 2014 #35"). A pre-written prompt sheet was prepared, which provided an interview framework focusing on the political, regulatory and economic dimensions of the Russian institutional environment.  Confidentiality was agreed and guaranteed with the participating owner-managers, with their responses and associated quotations being anonymised and all recorded data destroyed at the completion of the study.   
All 17 interviews were digitally recorded and the responses were manually transcribed in order to obtain a verbatim record for further analysis.  The resultant data were then processed using thematic analysis, which is considered one of the most appropriate tools for qualitative data analysis (King and Horrocks 2010).  This technique enabled us to conduct the analysis iteratively, leading to the identification of a set of key themes relating to the issues under investigation (Huberman and Miles 2002).  Initial coding was also developed and employed as the critical element of the entire analytical process by which these themes were generated from the data (Howitt and Cramer 2011). The codes were used to label specific parts of transcribed interview data relating to our research question and the issues examined. This approach also entailed retrieval of similar data, thus allowing the reduction of raw material and subsequent categorisation of our qualitative findings into the main themes of the research (Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña 2014). 

Findings AND DISCUSSION
Our focus in the interview discussions centered around participants’ views of the current institutional conditions that prevailed in Russia, and the resultant barriers that they created to entrepreneurship and SME growth as well as barriers to doing and expanding businesses in Russia. Employing the conceptual framework suggested by Holmes et al. (2013), we focused our data gathering and subsequent analysis on three formal institutional dimensions in turn – political, regulative and economic.

Political Dimension of the Formal Institutional Environment
Almost all of the respondents offered views on Russian government and public services’ attitudes and actions towards SMEs. The majority stated that they had experienced a lack of support and guidance from the government, which had shown varying levels of disregard and disinterest towards them. Thus, Participant 1 stated that officials had shown no interest in her business, disclosing some examples of careless interactions to illustrate this point: ‘Six years after establishing my business there was a call from the tax and revenue inspectors, they said that they were carrying out planned inspections on SMEs, [and asked] ‘is everything all right with you doing business?’, I said ‘yes’, - ‘well good, [they replied] then we will consider this inspection fulfilled’. 
Similarly, Participant 3 touched on the subject of what she believed to be the officials’ lack of knowledge about the state policies towards business development, training and support, and the inability of government bodies to provide relevant instructions and clarification to businesses, as well as their unwillingness to assist entrepreneurs with helpful advice and useful information. On this point, Participant 6 stated that it may be somewhat easy to ‘get fallen into a trap with registration procedures for individual entrepreneurs, because of unclear instructions and directions for registration’. Participant 3 explained that: ‘The small businesses experience a lack of knowledge and understanding of how formal regulative structures such as health and safety, tax inspections and customs services work. It is rather veiled in our country and it is extremely difficult to work without special legal education’. 
Participant 4 concluded from his experience of officialdom that: ‘We have to run from one room to another collecting paper after paper and at the end it turned out to be useless and a complete waste of our time, since nothing really mattered for my business’. Participant 12 also exclaimed:  ‘The impression is as if we are not needed in the country whatsoever. I understand we don’t pay as much tax as Gazprom, but still it would be good to have some appreciation for what we do’. Moreover, Participant 8 was very disturbed by what he saw as being a lack of any official interest in the problems of SMEs and his inability to obtain any serious consultation from the relevant government authorities: ‘Everyone was trying to show off and humiliate you by their power, like they are big bosses, even if they are not, and that is where the administrative barriers begin. Bureaucracy multiplies here because representatives of government try to make the process of receiving any permit or anything connected with managing a business as complex as possible’. Participant 4 also identified a number of political obstacles to doing business in Russia, focusing in particular on the ‘form-driven and not the substance driven approach’ that officials followed, as well as the frequency with which the authorities changed the technical regulations, auditing and accountancy requirements that businesses faced. 
Despite these negative experiences, it would appear that perceived administrative barriers to business may now be decreasing gradually in Russia, according to respondents 9 and 13. Some owner-managers (Participants 6 and 11) believed that gradual improvements were now being made, involving the simplification of business registration procedures, the improvement of communications with businesses, and the upgrading of SMEs’ access to government information sources and electronic databases. On this note, Participant 6 expressed the view that improvements were indeed now under way, facilitating business access to government, and improving the availability of official information to businesses: ‘Gradually, official institutions are becoming more accessible for SMEs. On the websites of municipal authorities you may find out information about free plots of land, vacant municipal buildings for rent, about tenders and supporting programs for entrepreneurs’. Participant 11 also concluded: ‘Well, in general, improvements are under way and the progress is visible, but there is still a long way to go. Our country is yet far behind the EU and other developed countries’. 
These views aside, the single most striking observation that emerged from the interviews focused on the issue of politicians’ culture and general government attitudes, and the way in which these affect SMEs’ operations and strategies. Participants 5 and 17 raised the issue of ‘different mentalities’ between people in politics, government and the business community amongst the main barriers that they felt constrained their companies’ development. Deep-seated communication problems appeared to remain in place, including the persistence of what some (Participants 11 and 14) saw as ‘carelessness in communication and ignorance’ and ‘mutual disrespect’ between government representatives and entrepreneurs. 
Some participants, interestingly, related this state of affairs to underlying problems in the relationship between government bodies and SMEs, comprising a continuing lack of trust and divergent mutual expectations, creating a general lack of clarity as to how the regulative system works, resulting in confusion and suspicion between the two sides. Participant 2 took this argument further, stating: ‘that it would be advisable for Russian SMEs, if possible, to avoid any kind of communication and interaction with the authority representatives in the country, if you do not want trouble’. Sufficient improvements were not, in his view, yet being made across the range of formal power branches and authorities in Russia. Some laggard institutions therefore still needed ‘to make their websites more informative, change interface and provide entrepreneurs with more relevant, easy to understand and direct step-by-step instructions of how to comply with ever-changing requirements and not just provide the local news and weather forecasts’. 
Participant 6 went on to argue that Russia’s longstanding cultural perception of commercial activities by privately owned businesses needs changing for the better, in order to help entrepreneurs and SMEs to thrive in the future: ‘A more positive image of entrepreneurs and perceptions about entrepreneurship should be formed by the authorities. The old-fashioned communist image of businessmen as dishonest speculators and culprits still exists in many minds, and it may be hard to prove otherwise, when people only notice cases of businessmen breaking laws and police putting them in jail.’ 
These points are consistent with Radaev’s (2003) argument, that many Russian business people are still perceived by government and bureaucratic decision makers as being unethical, opportunistic and profit-seeking individuals who aim to damage the economy and violate all possible legislative requirements. Business leaders often, in turn, question the legitimacy and common sense underlying regulatory procedures and standards, whilst frequently resorting to unorthodox strategies and somewhat dubious modes of business conduct. Thus, a lack of mutual respect between businessmen and state officials continues to create a situation where “entrepreneurs tend to see every public official as a bribe-taker predominantly interested in their private gain and at the same time, public officials tend to treat every entrepreneur as a smuggler evading taxes and customs duties” (Radaev 2004, 107). The result is the persistence of a negative climate, involving unwillingness to comply with the law, a search for loopholes, and systematic attempts to circumvent the rules, fueling mistrust between businesses and government.
Taken together, all of the respondents’ comments concerning dealings with government indicate a lack of satisfaction with recent and ongoing reforms which were perceived as inefficient, inactive and superficial. Some of the respondents went on to state that they believed more drastic and fundamental changes were now required to promote SMEs’ access to financial resources, public procurement, reduce tariffs for utility services, and simplify electricity connection and technical permits.  In overall terms, these findings are consistent with McMillan and Woodruff (2002) and Michailova et al. (2013), who identify government and formal institutional resistance to improving the investment climate, facilitating conditions for doing business and eradicating administrative barriers as continuing to limit the development of business activities and entrepreneurship in transition economy countries such as Russia. 

Regulative Dimension of the Formal Institutional Environment
A key objective of this section in the current study was to examine the perceived effects of Russia’s official regulatory procedures on SMEs’ functioning and commercial performance. Much of the interview discussion centered around the issue of owner-managers’ exposure to the intermittent and selective regulative attention of some state law-enforcement services as well as their reactions to the main administrative obstacles and compliance issues that impeded growth of entrepreneurship in the country. 
Most of the participants expressed significant dissatisfaction with the inefficiencies and the inequitable treatment of Russia’s legal system, highlighting what they regarded as inconsistency in legal application, equality and ‘untouchability’ issues, together with the existence of informal privileges and complex litigation procedures. These problems were perceived as leading to a profusion of administrative barriers for businesses, contributing to widespread corruption and the need for SMEs to maintain ‘special connections’ with the authorities.  As Participant 5 argued, ‘In Russia, the law is like an axle, you can turn it whichever way you please, if you give it plenty of grease. So, some [businesses] can encounter constant visits and inspections from controlling and regulating institutions, while others do not experience any pressures whatsoever’. 
Participant 8 saw the main cause of such problems as being the impotency and insufficient implementation of the rule of law and selective law enforcement: ‘Equal compliance with law is important. Whether for a shepherd or the president there should be equal legal rights and responsibilities. Among all courts and Offices of Public Prosecutor the equality should be a must’. In his opinion, inequality and social polarization were currently leading to an increased abuse of power and increasingly widespread corruption in Russia. 
Participant 10 had a suspicious feeling when claiming back VAT for a machinery purchase, wondering why this case had taken such an unduly long time to process, while he was required to complete a large volume of additional documents in order to file his claim. He also stated that: ‘The corrupted bureaucrats and inspectors must be blamed for all here. Everyone is concentrated with only collecting papers, following special procedures and signing documents, putting rubber stamps and going through different representatives of multi-stage institutions. In general, far too much… hassle and… paperwork… is used to extract something from us’. 
Corruption does not stand alone in the owner-managers’ statements, since they all linked it to the value to their businesses of special connections (including ‘svyazi’ and ‘blat’) in responding effectively to inequality and variable law-enforcement problems. Participants 14 and 16 expressed the belief that it was difficult, or in fact nearly impossible, to promote any businesses and take them to new levels of development without having good relationships with representatives of the country’s regional and municipal authorities: ‘Business entities possessing useful networks with government authorities and administrative resource tend to be more successful and competitive in Russia. The unwritten rules matter’. Participant 17 also explained that: ‘In the Russian regions it is very hard to receive allotments of land for construction of buildings or warehouses. It is extremely time consuming and expensive to resolve technical matters such as connecting to the electricity grid, gas supply or water delivery. Whilst these arrangements are under consideration, the entrepreneur has to bear all the costs - pay salaries to workers, service the bank loans, make contributions to the pension and social security funds’. 
Participant 3 went on to argue that, without ‘proper networking’ with the incumbent officials, small and medium sized businesses would be exposed to all sorts of administrative pressures and regulatory interventions, which would be damaging to their commercial interests: ‘Often laws contradict each other and they are unfair and impossible to follow, so SMEs are like cash cows here, but only cash cows for the government. They try to extract their profits with the help of different requirements and regulative entities that come to monitor you like tax inspection, firefighters, economic crimes police, labor law regulators and so on and so forth.’ This seemed to be a persistent problem experienced by most of the respondents, in that the sheer number of controlling bodies and the quantity of constant and unplanned inspections and officials’ visits that they all faced occupied a great deal of their time and effort, and impeded business development. Participant 11 noted, for example, that ‘any investigation might be launched from any types of complaints with no reason, the official might even report a problem himself from a different room to initiate a scrutiny of your business dealings. So, you have to be ready to return a favour, if the inspection is postponed’. Participant 13 also complained that, in his view there was ‘no stable legal base for businesses, laws can change twice year. You cannot rely on the court system either; there is no guarantee for a quick and honest problem solution. The “telephone justice” [different means of informal pressures on the judiciary] still prevails, as a result risk increases by several times’.
Under these circumstances, the conduct of business generally needs to be opaque, while the formation of business expectations can also be problematic, resulting in the allocation of strategic priority status to the creation of ‘special relations’, or in other words, ‘svyazi’ with government officials. Bureaucratic complexity and corruption tend to pervade all formal regulatory channels that our respondents dealt with, crystallizing their need to pursue informal dealings, and to seek indirect influence over the inspection process, the functioning of courts and other law-enforcement agencies.  
Business networks consequently resort to relational contract enforcement as a substitute for weak formal institutional protection and property rights violation (Estrin and Mickiewicz 2011) that otherwise damage SMEs’ commercial interests. Indeed, the tendency towards ‘informalization’ of business relationships with the state arises from what is often a profound mistrust of the country’s governing authorities and judicial system, together with discrepancies in application of law and the unwillingness of business leaders to manage any legal disputes that they could have been resolved via officially established but practically onerous procedures (Ledeneva 2009; Radaev 2003). As a result, the current business climate in Russia can still be characterized by the “weaknesses in the legitimacy of formal institutions” and the existence of “formal institutional voids” and “the dominance of cultural-cognitive informal institutions in making and implementing business decisions” (Puffer and McCarthy 2011, 25). 
All respondents identified the problems of over-bureaucratisation, corruption and red tape in their comments on the value to them of the institutional improvements that they saw as now being proclaimed by the Russian government. Participant 9, for example, recommended the need for formal institutions to be urgently reformed in order to generate ‘total transparency and accountability of systems regulating entrepreneurial activity and stop these people [bureaucrats] earning money on their positions’. Participant 1 took a more positive view, however, arguing that visible improvements in Russia’s business-related bureaucratic procedures had been made between the time when she established her business (in 2001) and the present day: ‘I collected enormous amounts of documents and permits [then], now it is all faster, easier through one-window service’. She also argued that these new regulative measures had proven to be effective since, for example, the need to license particular types of business activities had now been cancelled. However, she remained concerned that these positive trends might be temporary and the improvements take place only in the Russian capital and not throughout the country. 
Our remaining respondents rejected any suggestion that there had been substantial and sufficient improvements in the rule of law, ease of administrative pressures and regulatory complexity facing their businesses, noticing only limited attempts to introduce reforms and enhance transparency of the legal requirements, as recorded by previous surveys (Baker and McKenzie 2012; PWC 2014). These findings are consistent with those of Puffer et al. (2010) and Volchek et al. (2013) who reported the persistent reluctance and inertia of the Russian officials in the bureaucratic apparatus to change their aggressive regulatory approaches and implement more rule-based and predictable law-enforcement procedures.  We also believe from these findings (following Aidis et al. 2008) that it is not just the size of the state sector in Russia, but also concerns and anxieties regarding insufficient market freedoms, high levels of corruption, the arbitrary quality of many of the government’s dealings with business and excessive and dysfunctional bureaucratic regulation that discourages many potential entrepreneurs from going into business. 

Economic Dimension of the Formal Institutional Environment
The majority of the respondents indicated that significant macroeconomic problems persist in Russia, constraining domestic businesses growth. Further economic difficulties for business have also been created over the past year by the exposure of the Russian economy to Western sanctions, restricted access to the international financial markets, and decrease in foreign portfolio and direct investments, owing to the current state of the Ukrainian crisis. 
 Against this background, three out of the 17 respondents characterized Russia’s economic environment as possessing a range of challenging factors which were inhibiting business development and expansion, including: ‘permanent instability’ (Participant 4), ‘continuing risk of volatile economic conditions’ (Participant 7) and ‘short-termism as the name of the game’ (Participant 13). Participants 12 and 15 went on to identify a need for the alleviation of the taxation burden and simplification of the fiscal requirements as a means of reducing transaction costs and further improvement of the conditions for entrepreneurship and business development in Russia. 
Participant 7 emphasized the difficulties in making payments related to increasing taxes and other government-imposed levies: ‘The government is trying to destroy all SMEs. This is for sure, as all methods are used to destroy them by imposing property taxes using unified cadastre, making petrol more expensive, increasing tariffs for electricity and utilities provided by natural monopolies, additionally increasing social insurance contributions and state pension fund payments’. Participant 3 also pointed to a perceived need to develop a more simplified taxation system, arguing that: ‘the government needs to support our requests, when manufacturers ask to make taxation policy easier, there should be some reaction and response and not just increase taxes to feed this bureaucracy machine’. On a positive note, Participant 2 indicated some perceived advantages for businesses following the introduction of new, electronic tax reporting systems: ‘Now profit and loss accounts can be just sent electronically via email and you receive statements in which all arrangements with taxes can be tracked and checked’. Similarly, Participant 5 identified what he saw as being the added convenience and significant stimuli for businesses, which would result if greater use were to be made of internet services and web-based communications, especially for sending tax accounts, applying for tax breaks, permits, guarantees for loans and subsidised bank interest rates. 
Interestingly enough, the respondents indicated contrasting opinions regarding the relative importance of different financial and economic difficulties for their own business operations and performance. Participant 1, for example argued that ‘…exactly in my business, there has been only ONE main difficulty, the renting of a place for an office. It eats up enormous amount of profit and is unfairly and artificially overpriced’, whilst also stating that…‘it is fast [or quick and easy] now to obtain access to the necessary financial resources to fix the temporary cash flow problems’. In contrast, Participants 2 and 6 stressed the problems that they had been experiencing with securing finances, especially start-up capital, as banks imposed very high interest rates on loans that they thought most businesses deemed unbearable.  
Participants 14 and 17 went on to state that the most important factor for their businesses are ‘banks’ policy, interest rate and opportunities to get a loan’ stressing that ‘the lending system in Russia is a painful issue’, especially for SMEs, ‘as how a business with profitability of 5-7%, which is typical for my company, can possibly pay 13-18% interest rate on debt financing’. Participant 13 supported this opinion, elaborating on his own difficulties in the transportation industry, where the amortization of vehicles takes five to seven years whereas loans have to be paid over only one or two years. He invited the interviewer to ‘imagine what risks and pressures businesses experience’ for this reason, arguing that decisions on whether to expand or further investment depend mainly on the willingness of banks to provide long-term affordable business loans. 
Finally, Participant 8 stated that one of his first reasons for not developing his business more quickly and not engaging in international operations was high custom duties: ‘The custom duty is so big, that it prevents all the processes from going. If we pursued international expansion, the Customs Services would eat up our profitability. For that reason we are selling the product only inside our country’. 

CONCLUSION
The exploratory path followed in this study aimed at providing an understanding of the perceived current reality of doing business in Russia on the part of SME owner-managers and their reactions to recent changes in the institutional environment.  The case study findings enabled us to address our research question in the form of respondents’ comments regarding the impact of political, regulatory and economic institutions on their businesses, linking back to our earlier contextual analysis. By identifying and elaborating the views of these SME owner-managers, the study has contributed to the body of scholarly knowledge and understanding of the state of the Russian institutional climate and its impact on businesses, so helping to fill a gap in the literature, which mainly focuses on theoretical descriptions and explanations of Russia’s institutional problems.
Even after 25 years of economic transition, our empirical findings support the dominant view that poor institutional quality still deters entrepreneurship in modern Russia, impacting negatively on the country’s small and medium sized business development and growth prospects. This study has highlighted a range of perceived, systemic weaknesses within the country’s formal institutional system, including flaws in its legal system, the unequal application of company law, widespread over-bureaucratization and overregulation and abuse of public office, that greatly lessen the ease with which business can be done and value-adding activities carried out in the SME sector of the modern Russian economy. New evidence has also been found in support of a range of chronic problems for business in Russia identified in the earlier literature, including corruption, government pressure on business and challenging administrative barriers inhibiting the development of business initiatives. We have also found additional evidence to the effect that a lack of clarity and confusion in codifying the rules of the game, mutual distrust, and communication problems are at the center of ineffective and unproductive businesses-government relations in Putin’s Russia.  
Our respondents identified the importance of the power and influence exerted over their businesses by the national formal institutions responsible for setting political priorities for SME development, regulative burden and law-enforcement as well as creating a favorable and predictable economic environment. This study therefore lends support to the view that the role of formal institutions in Russia is still orientated towards excessive regulation and sporadic government interventions where public officials transmit complacency about the need for institutional reforms, occupying the position of examiners, inspectors and controllers instead of facilitators of business activities and SME development. Taken together, these factors continue to degrade Russia’s economic environment and business climate, so placing major constraints on the country’s entrepreneurship and SME development. 

Limitations and further research
This study has a number of limitations that need to be considered.  One such limitation related to the chosen case study methodology, whilst only a small number of Russian SME owner-managers participated in the research.  The geographical concentration of our respondents can also be seen as a limitation, even though we included businesses from three different and geographically distant Federal Districts in the north, centre and the south of European Russia in our study. Economic and regulatory institutions vary across the country, resulting in differing types of influence on the institutional environment for entrepreneurship development.  This issue can be taken into account in future by multi-regional research within Russia, which could enable examination of subnational differences and variations in conditions of doing business and the resultant effects on entrepreneurship and SME activities.  The findings from this study can also serve as a starting point for future research on the institutional environment in other former Soviet countries, and its effects on business.   
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